COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS
IN THE SUPREME COURT

CRIMINAL DIVISION

CRI/VBI/332/12/2022

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

AND

JERMAINE LAING

Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Jeanine Weech-Gomez

Appearances: Ms. Davina Pinder with Mr. Valentino Bowe for the Director of Public Prosecutions

Mr. Damien White for the Convict

Hearing Date: 25 August 2026

DECISION ON SENTENCING

Sentencing – Attempted Murder – Penal Code, Chapter 84, s.292 – Guilty Plea – Comparator Authorities – Aggravating Factors – Premeditation – Use of a Weapon – Targeting of a Vulnerable Area of the Body – Injury to a Third Party – Mitigating Factors – Early Guilty Plea – Youth – Absence of Previous Convictions – Remorse – Proportionality

WEECH-GOMEZ, J.

Introduction

1. Mr. Jermaine Laing ("the Convict"), D.O.B. 28 December 1998 (presently 27 years of age), stands before this Court for sentencing having pleaded guilty to one count of Attempted Murder, contrary to **section 292 of the Penal Code, Chapter 84 of the Statute Law of The Bahamas ("the Code").** The particulars are that on 24 April 2022, the Convict, while armed with two knives, attempted to kill his former girlfriend, Lavinia Dorvilus ("the Complainant"), at her residence.

2. On Sunday, 24 April 2022, at around 9:00 p.m., the Complainant was seated outside her residence speaking on her cellular telephone with a male acquaintance. When the call ended, she became aware that the Convict, her former boyfriend, was standing behind her. Feeling uncomfortable at his presence, she began to walk, and then run, away from him. The Convict caught up with her and placed his hand around her neck. He then stabbed her in the arm and attempted to stab her in the throat; she raised her hand to defend herself and was stabbed in the hand as a result.

3. The Complainant called out for her sister, Renika, who came out of the home and attempted to ward off the attack by striking the Convict with a bucket. In the course of the struggle the Convict slipped out of his shirt and fled the scene. The Complainant was driven by her sister to the Princess Margaret Hospital, where she was treated, received stitches to her finger, and was given prescription medication. Police attended the scene and recovered a knife.

4. In the aftermath, the Complainant received a text message from the Convict apologising and stating that he did not intend to harm her, followed by a further message stating *"Please don't die."* She subsequently received a further message from him stating *"I hope you dead."* After his release on bail in

respect of this matter, the Convict again contacted the Complainant, this time by Facebook Messenger, purportedly attempting to salvage the relationship; the Complainant maintained that the relationship was over.

5. The Convict was cautioned and arrested at approximately 11:08 p.m. the same evening. Upon arrest he stated: *"I stabbed my girlfriend, Lavina because I caught her cheating. I was going to kill her and afterwards jumped in the canal and kill myself."* On 26 April 2022, he was further interviewed under caution, in the course of which he again confessed to stabbing the Complainant, admitted that he was armed with both a pocket knife and a kitchen knife, stated that he had made up his mind to kill the Complainant and then take his own life, and that he had intended to cut her throat. He described the struggle continuing on the ground after the Complainant's family intervened, in his own words: "*I then pull another knife and I grabbed Lavina by the neck and was about to stab her with a big kitchen knife; this is when her family member grabbed the knife from me*." It is common ground, and the Court so finds, that the Convict did not in fact carry out his further stated intention against himself.

6. The Convict was granted bail and thereafter pleaded guilty prior to trial. The precise date of his arraignment does not appear on the record before this Court; what is undisputed, and the Court accepts, is that the plea was entered before the matter proceeded to trial, and that the Convict cooperated with the police investigation from its inception. The matter was thereafter adjourned for the preparation of a Probation Report and for sentencing submissions, which were heard on 25 August 2026.

Evidence

The Probation Report

7. Ms. Deah Duvalier, a Probation Officer with the Department of Rehabilitative and Welfare Services under the Department of Social Services, prepared a Probation Officer's Report of Investigation dated 26 June 2026, which was tendered and admitted without objection as Exhibit A. The following is a summary of its contents, supplemented by Ms. Duvalier's oral evidence.

8. The Convict is a 27-year-old bachelor with no children, who resides at Number 12 Ned Wallace Street, off Joe Farrington Road. He is a Bahamian national of the Christian faith and was unemployed at the time of the Report. He was reared in a nuclear-family household by his parents, although his father did not play a prominent role in his upbringing. He completed a high-school education, although he was not academically inclined, and was nonetheless able to secure and maintain consistent employment over the years prior to his remand.

9. Persons interviewed by the Probation Officer characterised the Convict as *"a quiet, reserved, humorous, outgoing, respectful, calm, articulate, well-mannered, smart, caring, nice, helpful, kind, generous and selfless person,"* and were generally shocked to learn of his involvement in the present offence. His family and friends expressed a desire that the Court grant him leniency, stating that they believe his well-being will decline if he receives a custodial sentence.

10. The Complainant did not explicitly state her own view as to penalty; her sister, who is also a witness in the matter, stated that the Convict should be incarcerated. The Report records that the Convict pleaded guilty from the outset, *"opting not to waste the Court's time,"* that he expressed remorse for his actions, and that he indicated a willingness to accept the consequences and, if given the opportunity, to apologise to the Complainant. It further records,

and Mr. White confirmed in submissions, that the Convict voluntarily undertook anger-management counselling while on bail.

11. The Probation Officer's ultimate recommendation was that *"all of the above be taken into consideration when passing sentence."* It was not disputed by either party, and the Criminal Records Antecedent Form of the Royal Bahamas Police Force confirmed, that the Convict has no previous convictions.

12. On the Court's own inquiry of Ms. Duvalier, it was confirmed that a medical report from the Accident and Emergency Department, dated 27 April 2022, recorded the Complainant's injury as *"a laceration at the pulp of the left index finger,"* and answered *"Nil"* to the question whether the injury was likely to terminate fatally. Ms. Duvalier confirmed that her investigation did not reveal, and she would not have been aware of, any long-term injury suffered by the Complainant, and that she would accordingly have been satisfied that none was sustained.

Counsel's Submissions

Defence Counsel's Submissions

13. Mr. Damien White, counsel for the Convict, submitted that sentencing requires the Court to examine the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case individually, and that a sentencing judge, while guided by previous sentences, is not restricted to them. He relied on ***Larry Raymond Jones v Regina*** **SCCrim App No. 261 of 2012** for its identification of relevant sentencing considerations the offender's character, the circumstances of the offence, remorse, the timing of any guilty plea, whether the offender poses a danger to the public, the prospect of rehabilitation, and the offender's mental condition and on ***Commissioner of Police v Brian Botham*** **MCCrApp & CAIS No. 134 of 2015**, for the proposition that *"it is indisputable that sentencing must serve a societal purpose,"* and that, other than in cases of mandatory sentencing, *"the*

sentence meted out must be rigorously justified by reference to settled sentencing objectives and principles as well as the facts of each case." He further relied on Lord Bingham CJ's observations in ***R v Avis and others*** **[1997] EWCA Crim J1216-6** , as cited in ***Commissioner of Police v Brian Botham*** *supra*, that an early guilty plea *"will obviously be a strong mitigating factor,"* together with an expression of remorse, a clean criminal record, young age, employment status, the possibility of rehabilitation, and cooperation with the police investigation.

14. Counsel placed principal reliance on ***Ernesta Butler***, submitting that its facts were ***"starkly similar"*** to the present matter. He noted that Jones JA had dissented from the Court of Appeal's decision upholding a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment in that case, being of the view that the sentence was too low, but that the sentence was otherwise upheld, and that other cases from that period had imposed sentences for Attempted Murder under 15 or 12 years. He submitted that Ms. Butler had gone through a full trial and nonetheless received 7 years' imprisonment, whereas the Convict pleaded guilty; that the medical evidence in the present matter showed an injury materially less serious than the stab wound to the neck sustained by the complainant in Butler; and that, unlike a number of the Crown's authorities, no firearm was used in the present matter.

Mitigating Factors

15. Counsel submitted that the following mitigating factors applied on behalf of the Convict:

    (a) **Early guilty plea.** The Convict pleaded guilty prior to trial, sparing the Court and the Complainant's family the burden of a contested trial.

    (b) **Absence of previous convictions.** The Convict has no previous convictions and is, Counsel submitted, ripe for rehabilitation.

(c) **Youth.** The Convict was 23 years of age at the time of the offence and remains a relatively young man.

(d) **Cooperation with the investigation.** The Convict assisted the police from the onset and admitted his guilt and the part he played.

(e) **Remorse and rehabilitative steps.** The Convict has expressed remorse, per the Probation Report, and voluntarily undertook anger-management counselling while on bail, on his own volition.

(f) **Domestic context and absence of a firearm.** Counsel submitted that the matter arose from a domestic dispute that ***"somewhat got out of control,"*** and that no firearm was used, in contrast to several of the Crown's authorities.

16. On this basis, Counsel submitted that a starting point of 7 years' imprisonment, as in Butler, was appropriate, with a further one-third discount for the guilty plea, and that nothing in the authorities constrained the Court from sentencing within, or below, that range.

Prosecution's Submissions

17. Counsel for the Crown, Ms. Davina Pinder, submitted that the Convict was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, Attempted Murder contrary to section 292 of the Code, arising from a sustained knife attack on his former girlfriend at her home.

Aggravating Factors

18. In relation to aggravating factors, the Crown identified the following:

(a) The nature and seriousness of the offence.

(b) The degree of planning involved, the Convict having armed himself with not one but two knives.

(c) The Convict's pursuit of the Complainant up to the point at which he attempted to execute his plan to kill her.

(d) The prevalence of domestic violence against women in The Bahamas.

19. The Crown accepted a single mitigating factor, namely that the Convict pleaded guilty prior to trial, though it submitted that this was not entered at the earliest opportunity.

20. The Crown relied on a number of authorities. In ***Vilner Desir v Delano Taylor*** **SCCrApp & CAIS No. 45 of 2015**, the Court of Appeal was cited for the proposition that *"society's displeasure of acts of this nature is reflected in the length of maximum sentence imposed by Parliament and the Court ought to treat the offence of Attempted Murder as a serious offence,"* and for the fact that a differently constituted Court of Appeal set aside a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for Attempted Murder and substituted a sentence of 25 years. The Crown also relied on ***The Director of Public Prosecutions v Mike Philius*** **SCCrApp.No.204 of 2024**, in which a trial sentence of 10 years' imprisonment was increased on appeal to 25 years; on ***Bendrico Bain*** **SCCr.App. 199 of 2012**, in which Allen JA observed that "35 years' imprisonment for murder is not unduly severe, neither is 25 years' imprisonment for Attempted Murder," the range for murder having been established in ***Larry Raymond Jones v Regina*** *supra* as 30 to 60 years; on ***Michael Scott*** **(VR No. 163 of 2012*)***, in which the appellant, convicted of the attempted murder of his estranged wife after inflicting some 40 stab wounds, was sentenced to 34 years' imprisonment, affirmed on appeal; and on ***Raul Pierre v Regina*** **(No. 48 of 2017)**, in which the appellant, convicted of attempted murder by pointing a firearm that jammed

at a complainant who escaped unscathed, was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The Crown further invoked the classical objects of sentencing in terms materially identical to those discussed by this Court below in support of a sentence with a strong deterrent component.

21. On this footing, the Crown initially submitted that a sentence of 15 to 20 years' imprisonment was appropriate. Upon further consideration, including of the extent to which the guilty plea ought to be credited, the Crown refined its position to a range of 10 to 20 years' imprisonment, submitting that nothing less than 12 years would be appropriate, and that a sentence as low as 7 years, as proposed by the Defence, would be unduly lenient.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Sentencing (General Principles)

22. **Section 6 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 91 ("CPC"),** provides that the Supreme Court may pass any sentence authorised by law to be inflicted in respect of the offence for which it is imposed. Section 185(1) further provides that the Court may, before handing down a sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit to inform itself as to the proper sentence, and may receive representations from the victim or hear counsel on any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may be relevant.

23. The applicable principles governing the sentencing exercise were comprehensively stated by the Court of Appeal in ***Attorney General v Quincy Todd,*** **SCCrApp No. 56 of 2010**, where it was observed that sentencing is a judicial function and by far the most important function a trial judge has to perform; that in the absence of statutory limitations the judge has a wide discretion, which must be exercised judiciously, taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors, the nature of the crime, and the manner in which it was perpetrated, bearing in mind that no two cases are alike.

24. This Court further adopts the observation of the Court of Appeal in ***Attorney General's Reference No. 4 of 1989 (1990) [1990] 1 WLR 41***, cited with approval in this jurisdiction, that sentencing is

> *"an art rather than a science; that the trial judge is particularly well placed to assess the weight to be given to various competing considerations; and that leniency is not itself a vice."*

25. As of 5 November 2014, mandatory minimum sentences have been declared unconstitutional and abolished pursuant to the **Abolition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences Act, Chapter 94A ("the AMMS Act"),** section 2 of which provides that *"where a provision in any law has the effect of requiring a court to impose a minimum term of imprisonment, that provision, to the extent of that requirement, shall be of no effect*." **Section 116(3) of the Code** further provides that, subject to the provisions of the Code or of any other statute relating to the offence, the Court may, in its discretion, sentence a convicted person to any lesser term of imprisonment than the term prescribed. The Court accordingly retains full discretion as to the appropriate term of imprisonment in this matter.

26. This Court adopts the four classical principles of sentencing articulated by Sir Dennis Byron CJ (as he then was) in ***Desmond Banister v The Queen,*** **Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 2003** ***(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines)***: retribution, which reflects society's intolerance for criminal conduct; deterrence, both general (a restraint against potential criminal activity by others) and specific (a restraint against the particular offender relapsing into recidivist behaviour); prevention, which protects society from those who persist in high rates of criminality; and rehabilitation, which seeks to engage the offender in a manner that assists his reintegration into society. These four principles correspond, in substance, to the five objects of sentencing identified in ***Benjamin v R*** **(1964) 7 WIR 459**, as adopted in this jurisdiction and as reflected in the Crown's submissions on the objects of punishment retribution;

deterrence vis-à-vis potential offenders; deterrence vis-à-vis the particular offender; prevention; and rehabilitation.

The Law on the Offence

27. The Convict entered a plea of guilty to one count of Attempted Murder, contrary to **section 292 of the Penal Code, Chapter 84.** Neither party placed the text of section 292, nor its prescribed maximum penalty, before the Court at the sentencing hearing. What is clear, and undisputed, is that Attempted Murder is treated under Bahamian law as an offence of the utmost gravity, falling within the same Title of the Code as murder itself, and that no mandatory minimum sentence attaches to it, the Court retaining full discretion by virtue of the **AMMS Act and section 116(3) of the Code** discussed above.

28. The gravity with which the courts of this jurisdiction regard the offence, notwithstanding the absence of a fatality, is well established. In ***James Miller v The King*** **[2023] UKPC 10**, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, on appeal from the Court of Appeal of The Bahamas, upheld a determinate sentence of 40 years' imprisonment for the attempted murder of a police officer in the course of an armed robbery. The Board recognised that, while a court will in almost every case maintain a proportionate discount from the term appropriate for the completed offence of murder, it need not invariably do so. The Court of Appeal has likewise emphasised that Attempted Murder is to be treated as a serious offence, reflecting the maximum penalty prescribed by Parliament (***Attorney General v Vilner Desir & Delano Taylor*** *supra*). The authorities considered below disclose sentences ranging from 7 years (***Ernesta Butler*** **SCCrApp. No. 97 of 2019**) to 40 years (***Miller*** *supra*), although, for the reasons which follow, the lower of those figures is an outlier. This range informs, without fixing, the Court's discretion in the present matter.

Comparator Authorities and Starting Point

29. ***Ernesta Butler*** is the most factually proximate comparator relied upon by either party, and was the principal focus of both parties' submissions. In that matter, a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment was upheld by the Court of Appeal (Jones JA dissenting, on the basis that it was too low), notwithstanding that the offender proceeded to a full trial and maintained that she never intended to kill the complainant, relying on an account of prior abuse and self-defence. By contrast, the present Convict has, on his own repeated and unequivocal admissions at arrest, in his record of interview, and by his guilty plea confirmed that he armed himself in advance with two knives, formed a clear intention to kill the Complainant, and directed a blow at her throat, one of the most vulnerable areas of the human body. These are features of considerably greater objective culpability than those before the Court in ***Butler***, where intention was, at most, inferred rather than admitted. Further, the sentence in Butler lies well below the range consistently applied by the Court of Appeal both before and since that decision, and was itself regarded by Jones JA as too low. This Court does not, therefore, regard ***Butler*** as establishing the benchmark for the present case, and declines the invitation to adopt its figure as a starting point however, the Court does find it instrcutive.

30. The authorities relied upon by the Crown, together with further decisions of the Court of Appeal and of this Court, establish the range within which sentences for Attempted Murder following conviction after trial ordinarily fall: ***Raul Pierre v Regina*** **No. 48 of 2017** (15 years, where a firearm jammed and the complainant escaped unscathed); ***Emmanuel Rolle v DPP*** **SCCrApp. No. 195 of 2018** (20 years); ***Ian Mackey v DPP*** **SCCrApp. No. 53 of 2020** (20 years); ***DPP v Jeffery Musgrove & Delvandre Butler*** **CRI/VBI NO.155/08/2019** (20 and 18 years); ***Attorney General v Vilner Desir & Delano Taylor*** **SCCrApp. No. 45 of 2015** (10 years increased on appeal to 25 years); ***Director of Public Prosecutions v Mike Philius*** **SCCrApp. No. 204 of 2024** (10 years increased on appeal to 25 years); ***Shakatoure Thompson v DPP*** **SCCrApp. No. 144 of**

2017 (25 years); ***DPP v Matthew Capron*** **CRI/VBI/283/11/2025** (25 years, the victim having been stabbed five times in the back); and, at the upper end, ***Michael Scott v Regina*** **SCCrApp. No. 163 of 2012** (34 years, some 40 stab wounds having been inflicted) and ***Miller*** *supra* (40 years). The present matter is distinguishable from the more serious of these: no firearm was used; the actual injury sustained by the Complainant, on the unchallenged medical evidence, was a laceration to the finger, with no long-term sequelae identified; and, critically, the Convict pleaded guilty, unlike each of those offenders. Those differences must be reflected in the sentence, but the authorities remain the proper frame of reference.

31. Taking the authorities as a whole, and leaving ***Butler*** aside, sentences imposed after trial for Attempted Murder committed with a knife or firearm have in the main fallen between 15 and 25 years' imprisonment, rising above that range only where the offence was of exceptional gravity (***Michael Scott***; ***Miller***). Having regard to the nature of the offence, the comparatively contained scope of the harm actually caused, and the absence of a firearm, and leaving the particular aggravating features of this case to be addressed below, this Court fixes a starting point, before consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors and before any credit for the guilty plea, of **(15) fifteen years'** imprisonment. This starting point sits toward the lower end of the range for conviction after trial.

Aggravating and Mitigating Factors Application

32. Having fixed the starting point at **fifteen (15) years**, this Court turns to the identification and application of the aggravating and mitigating factors specific to this case.

33. In relation to aggravating factors, the Court identifies the following:

(a) **Premeditation and the use of multiple weapons.** The Convict armed himself with two knives; a pocket knife and a kitchen knife, before attending upon the Complainant. This reflects a degree of planning that distinguishes the offence from a wholly spontaneous act.

(b) **Targeting of a vulnerable area of the body.** On the Convict's own account, he directed a blow at the Complainant's throat, an area where even a single successful strike could readily have proved fatal.

(c) **Persistence of the attack.** The attack did not end with a single blow. The Convict choked the Complainant, stabbed her arm, attempted to stab her throat, and, even after being confronted by her sisters and momentarily disarmed, drew a further knife and renewed his attempt before he was ultimately stopped.

(d) **Post-offence conduct.** In the immediate aftermath, the Convict sent the Complainant a message stating *"I hope you dead,"* and, notwithstanding the gravity of the charge he faced, contacted her again after his release on bail in an attempt to resume the relationship.

34. In relation to mitigating factors, the Court identifies the following:

(a) **Guilty plea.** The Convict pleaded guilty prior to trial. Whilst the Crown submitted, without contradiction from the Defence on this specific point, that the plea was not shown to have been entered at the very earliest opportunity, the court notes and the record reflects that The Crown and Defence Counsel had enterred into discussions in relation to a plea agreement, and had sought adjournements on several occassions in an attempt to achieve this. It is nonetheless undisputed that the Convict cooperated with the investigation from its inception and spared the Court and the Complainant's family a contested trial. The credit to be afforded for the plea is addressed separately at paragraph 38 below.

(b) **Absence of previous convictions.** The Convict has no previous convictions, a matter confirmed by the Criminal Records Antecedent Form of the Royal Bahamas Police Force and unchallenged by the Crown.

(c) **Youth.** The Convict was 23 years of age at the time of the offence.

(d) **Comparatively limited actual injury.** Notwithstanding the seriousness of the Convict's intent, the actual injury sustained by the Complainant was, on the medical evidence, a laceration to the finger, with no long-term injury identified. This does not diminish the gravity of the offence as charged, but is a relevant consideration in respect of the harm actually caused.

(e) **Absence of a firearm.** No firearm was used, in contrast to several of the authorities relied upon by the Crown.

(f) **Remorse and steps toward rehabilitation.** The Convict has expressed remorse, per the Probation Report, and voluntarily undertook anger-management counselling while on bail through the Joshua Support Group for male perpetrator of violence, throught the Anglican Diocese Pastorial Care Ministry of his own volition, which this Court regards as a genuine, and necessarily provisional, indicator of insight and prospect of rehabilitation.

(g) **Employment history and family support.** The Convict maintained a consistent history of employment prior to these proceedings, and enjoys the support of family and friends who describe him, without exception, in positive terms.

Sentence

35. Bearing in mind all of the foregoing, I now turn to the appropriate sentence in this case.

36. The starting point fixed above is **fifteen (15) years'** imprisonment. Having regard to the aggravating factors identified in particular, the Convict's use of two knives, his targeting of the Complainant's throat, the persistence of the attack even after he was briefly disarmed, and his post-offence conduct this Court is satisfied that the starting point must be adjusted upward to 18 (18) years' imprisonment.

37. This Court then turns to the other mitigating factors available to the Convict, distinct from his plea: his youth, his clean record, his expressions of remorse, his voluntary undertaking of anger-management counselling while on bail, his employment history, and the support of his family. Giving weight to these matters, this Court reduces the figure of eighteen (18) years by two (2) years, to **sixteen (16) years'** imprisonment.

38. This Court must then give credit for the Convict's guilty plea. The full discount of one-third ordinarily afforded to a plea at the first reasonable opportunity is warranted. It is undisputed that the Convict cooperated with the police from the outset, made full admissions at arrest and in his record of interview, and by his plea spared the Complainant and her family the ordeal of giving evidence. Balancing these considerations, this Court affords a discount of one-third, yielding a reduction of five (5) years from the figure of **sixteen (16) years**.

39. Applying the principle of proportionality, that sentencing must reflect a just relationship between the seriousness of the offence and the sentence imposed and having regard to all of the matters discussed above, I am satisfied that the appropriate sentence in this case is **ten (10) years' imprisonment.**

40. There is no evidence before the Court that the Convict was remanded in custody pending these proceedings; to the contrary, the record indicates that he was released on bail and remained at liberty, subject to the conditions of his bail, up to and including the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, no credit for time spent on remand falls to be applied, and this sentence is to run from the date on which the Convict is received into custody pursuant to this Decision.

41. I am satisfied that the sentence of **ten (10) years** is neither unduly lenient nor disproportionate to the totality of the circumstances. It reflects the gravity of the situtation and it gives genuine effect to the mitigation factors available to the Convict.

ANCILLARY MATTERS

42. Neither party sought any ancillary order at the sentencing hearing, having regard to the Probation Report in which the Convict described himself as a lost young man, and Mr. Jermaine Johnson stated that he and the Convict have been close friends for more than ten years and he described the convict as a good easy going honest person who doesn't bother and one who stays out of trouble. Mr. Johnson stated that he was shocked when he learnt of the Convict's involvment as he doesn't know him to be aggressive. He opined that the Convict was negatively emotionally impacted by the relationship with the victim and he did not have the capacity to manage it; therefore, the outcome was the result. He views the offence as a mistake and asserted that the Convict did not intend to harm the victim. It is therefore ordered that the convict be afforded the opportunity to receive counselling whilst at the Bahamas Department of Corrections.

Conclusion

43. Sentencing is among the most important functions a trial judge performs. It must be conducted with care, consistency, and proportionality, giving due weight to all relevant circumstances and to the many competing considerations at play.

44. In the premises, and in consideration of all of the foregoing, I hereby sentence the Convict, Jermaine Laing, to a term of **ten (10) years' imprisonment,** to run from the date he is received into custody pursuant to this Decision.

Dated this 6th day of October, 2026

The Hon. Madam Justice Jeanine Weech-Gomez

Justice of the Supreme Court