

COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS
IN THE SUPREME COURT
COMMON LAW AND EQUITY DIVISION
2024/CLE/GEN/FP/00135

BETWEEN

IN THE MATTER OF the Status of Children Act

CARIN CELISSE BULLARD

Applicant

Before: The Honourable Justice Camille Darville Gomez

Appearances: Mrs . Tanisha Tynes Cambridge and Miss Ntshonda Tynes for the Applicant
Miss Nicholette Burrows for Mikia S Cooper holding a power of attorney for
Natalia Trent for the Respondent

Hearing Date: 23 October, 2025

*Civil Procedure – Power of Attorney – Joinder of Parties – Without Notice Applications - Family Law – Status of
Children Act – Section 12*

RULING

- [1.] This case highlights the difficulties that families may face when individuals die intestate or leave questions of paternity unresolved.
- [2.] Carlson Henry Shurland, (the “deceased”) a well-known attorney, died single and intestate on 15th July, 2024 leaving personal property valued in excess of eight hundred thousand dollars and several parcels of land in The Bahamas.
- [3.] The evidence on the record is that he had three children: one son, Renaldo Cruz Shurland (“Renaldo”) and two daughters, the Applicant, Carin Bullard (“Carin”), and Natalia Trent (“Natalia”).
- [4.] It is undisputed that Renaldo is the child of the deceased.
- [5.] The deceased was listed in the birth certificate of Renaldo as the ‘informant’. The relevance of this will be observed later.

[6.] Natalia's birth certificate listed her parents as Jan Renee (Ruth) and the deceased. It also has a notation as follows: *Amendments made prior to August 09, 2000 for this record are not noted on the certified copy.* "

[7.] Carin obtained an Order on 8th day of August, 2024 (a "declaration of paternity") in the following terms:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a declaration of Paternity be made AND IS HEREBY MADE WITH respect to the said Carlson Henry Shurand (deceased) and the said Carin Celisse Bullard in accordance with the provisions of Section 9(1) of the Status of Children Act."

[8.] It is also undisputed that Renaldo recognized both Natalia and Carin as his sisters.

The grant of Letters of Administration application

[9.] A grant of Letters of Administration was issued on 17 September, 2025 to Renaldo and Mikia S. Cooper, attorney-at-law and asserted attorney by deed of Power of Attorney for and on behalf of Natalia in the estate of the deceased. I will refer to this as the "grant of Letters of Administration application". The oath referred to the deceased having two children, Renaldo and Natalia and so did the affidavit of heirship sworn by the brother of the deceased, Glen L. Butler. The Grant is limited until such time as Natalia Trent has applied for and obtained a Grant of Letters of Administration.

[10.] Natalia was unaware of the declaration of paternity obtained by Carin at the time that the application for the grant was made because she was never served with the application or the order after it had been obtained. Renaldo however, supported the application for the declaration.

Contested Probate Action by Carin – Action NO. 2025/PRO/cpr/FP/00011

[11.] Carin filed a Fixed Date Claim on 19 September, 2025 against Mikia S. Cooper (attorney appointed by Power of Attorney for and on behalf of Natalia Trent) and Renaldo Cruz Shurland as Administrators of the estate of the deceased (the "contested probate action"). She claimed the following reliefs:

- (i) an Order pursuant to the Probate and Administration of Estates and/or under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court revoking the Grant of Letters of Administration issued to the Defendants on the 17th September, 2025 in respect of the estate of Carlson Henry Shurland, deceased; and
- (ii) an Order appointing the Claimant, Carin Celisse Bullard, as sole administrator of the Estate:

- (iii) alternatively, such further or other relief as the Court deems just in relation to the proper administration of the Estate;
- (iv) an order requiring the Defendants, as Administrators, to provide a full and complete accounting of all estate assets and liabilities, including, all dispositions, transfers, or transactions conducted since obtaining the Grant of Letters of Administration within a timeframe specified by the Court;
- (v) Costs.
- (vi) Such further relief as the Court deems just.

[12.] The basis upon which the contested probate action was made is as follows:

A. The deceased, Carlson Henry Shurland died intestate on the 15th July, 2024. He was survived by three children namely the Claimant, Carin Celisse Bullard, the second Defendant Renaldo Cruz Shurland and Natalia Trent. By an Order of this Honourable Court filed on the 8th August, 2024 a Declaration of Paternity was made with respect to the Claimant and the deceased, Carlson Henry Shurland, in accordance with the provisions of the Status of Children Act.

B. By virtue provisions of the Probate and Administration of Estates Act, the Claimant and her two said siblings are equally entitled to apply for a Grant of Letters of Administration in respect of the Estate.

C. On the 10th September, 2025, the Defendants, without notice to the Claimant, applied for and on the 17th September, 2025 obtained a Grant of Letters of Administration. Given the Defendants' demonstration of bad faith, the Claimant is concerned that the Defendants may dissipate or mismanage the Estate's assets to her prejudice. The Claimant relies on the Probate and Administration of Estates Act, Part 63 of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules 2022 and the inherent jurisdiction of this Honourable Court to supervise and regulate the proper administration of estates.

[13.] On 22 September 2025, in my capacity as Duty Judge, I granted an interim injunction restraining the Administrators, Mikia S. Cooper and Renaldo Cruz Shurland from dealing with the assets of the estate until further order of the Court, and directing them to furnish a full accounting of the estate's assets and liabilities.

[14.] In the contested probate action, Carin exhibited to her affidavit in support of the injunction, the declaration of paternity obtained in August 2024. Natalia was neither a party to nor served with notice of the application nor the declaration itself and only became aware of it in September, 2025 when she was served with the contested probate action.

- [15.] Mikia S. Cooper has applied to set aside or discharge the Declaration of Paternity, on the basis that it was obtained without proper notice to Natalia as an interested party.

The Application to set aside or vary the Declaration of Paternity Proceedings – Action No. 2024/CLE/GEN/FP/00135 (the “declaration of paternity proceedings”)

- [16.] By a Notice of Application filed on 15 October 2025, Mikia S. Cooper claimed the following reliefs pursuant to Part 11 and Rule 39.5 of the Supreme Court (Civil Procedure) Rules, 2022 (the “CPR”):

- (i) an Order that the Declaration of Paternity issued on 8 August, 2024 be set aside and/or discharged; and
- (ii) an Order that the Court do declare that the said Declaration of Paternity was obtained without proper notice to Natalia Trent, “an interested party” in the Estate of Carlson Henry Shurland (“Natalia”).

- [17.] The application is supported by several affidavits, including three affidavits sworn by Mikia S. Cooper on 15 and 27 October, 2025 and 17 November, 2025, an affidavit of Renaldo filed on 11 November, 2025 and a joint Affidavit sworn by Jan Renee Ruth-Estis and Rickey Estis filed on 18 November, 2025.

- [18.] Ms Cooper in her 17 November, 2025 affidavit responded to the affidavit of Carin filed on 13 November, 2025 and the affidavit of Pleasant Bridgewater filed in support of the declaration of paternity. I only intend to highlight those portions pertinent to these proceedings. Similarly, I will only address those relevant portions of the 15 October 2025 affidavit to these proceedings and for reasons that will become clearer later, I do not intend to address the contents of the 27 October, 2025 affidavit because it dealt specifically with the evidence adduced in the declaration of paternity action by Carin.

- [19.] In her 17 November, 2025 affidavit, Ms Cooper alleged that the issue of the adoption of Natalia was “new”. I refer to portions of her affidavit where she addressed this:

“3. *This allegation was not before the Court at the hearing of the Declaration of Paternity, nor was it disclosed in the Applicant’s originating affidavits filed in support of that application. I verily believe that the Applicant has introduced this allegation at this late state as a means of attempting to justify her failure to include Natalia in the paternity proceedings and her intentional concealment of the Order that resulted therefrom.*

4. *The Order for the Declaration of Paternity was filed on the 8th August 2024. That Order was never served on Natalia. I only became aware of the Order when I discovered it annexed as an exhibit G.I.T.1 to the Affidavit of G. Ingrid Tynes filed on the 19th September, 2025. The aforesaid Affidavit was filed in support of the 2025 application arising from the Fixed Date Claim Form filed on 19th September, 2025 seeking to revoke the Grant of Letters of Administration issued to Natalia and Crux on the 17th September, 2025.*

8. *There is no claim, contention or averment whatsoever in either the interim application or the revocation application asserting that Natalia was not a child of the deceased by reason of adoption, nor any reference suggesting that she was adopted. To date, the Applicant has made no application to challenge the presumption of Natalia's paternity or seeking to displace the same... .."*

[20.] Further, in her 15 October, 2025 affidavit, Mikia S. Cooper said as follows:

"12. Subsequent to the granting of the Declaration of Paternity and prior to the commencement of the application for Letters of Administration in the estate of the deceased, Natalia by way of email dated 2nd April, 2025 requested that the Applicant and or her attorney produce any documents to confirm or indicate her standing as a joint administrator and or heir-at-law. The Applicant failed and refused to produce the said Declaration of Paternity, notwithstanding that he same had been granted since the 8th day of August, 2024. Attached hereto and now shown to me is the said email marked "Exhibit MC-3".

"

Wed, Apr 2, 2025 at 3:59 PM

Dear Ms. Tynes,

I am instructed that there is no documentation to substantiate your client's eligibility for inclusion in the administration of this estate, nor to confirm her entitlement as a beneficiary or heir at law.

Should you possess any documentation that contradicts our instructions, I would be grateful if you could provide evidence of the same at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Nichollette"

- [21.] Jan Renee Ruth-Estis and Rickey Estis the mother and step father of Natalia in their joint affidavit denied that Natalia was ever adopted by her stepfather. Rather, for family unity her surname was changed to Estis. They explained that they encouraged, supported and facilitated the relationship between the deceased and Natalia until his death.
- [22.] Renaldo in his supplemental affidavit filed in November, 2025 explained that the only reason that Carin was excluded from the Letters of Administration Application was because she was unable to prove that she was a child of the deceased and that there was never an intention to disinherit her from sharing in the deceased's estate. Further, he said that Glen L. Butler, the uncle who swore the affidavit of heirship in the grant of Letters of Administration application had sought clarification as to the reason why Carin had been excluded from the application. Renaldo's statement that Carin was unable to prove that she was a child of the deceased was curious given that he supported her application for a declaration of paternity in 2024.
- [23.] Renaldo's evidence regarding his uncle, Glen L. Butler is at odds with that of Mikia S. Cooper who said as follows: *"Upon consulting with her uncle Glen L. Butler during the commencement of the joint administration of the estate, Natalia was informed by Glen that he did not know the Applicant to be a child of the deceased and had never known of any relationship between the Applicant and the deceased."*

[24.] However, Renaldo's evidence demonstrated his recognition, devotion and loyalty to both Natalia and Carin as his sisters.

[25.] In her affidavit filed on 13 November, 2025 Carin had this to say:

"9. Notably, a mere 2 and a half months after my father's death, Natalia commenced probate proceedings in Miami-Dade County in Florida, USA by filing a Petition seeking to be appointed the sole representative of my Dad's Florida estate. In her Petition dated the 1st October, 2024 Natalia named me as 1 of 3 children of Carlson Henry Shurland, deceased. A true copy of the Petitioner filed by Natalia in the said Florida proceedings is now shown to me and is exhibited hereto marked "C.C.M.4".

12. Ms Cooper alleges in her affidavit that I and/or my attorney failed refused and neglected to serve Natalia with documentation related to my application for a Declaration of Paternity knowing that Natalia had an interest in the estate of my Dad.

13. While it is true that Natalia was not served with documentation relating to the Declaration of Paternity issued herein, the reasons for the decision not to serve Natalia are not those stated by Ms. Cooper.

[My emphasis added]

14. After my father's death and before the application for a Declaration of Paternity herein had been heard, my brother Cruz advised me that our Dad had stated on several occasions to him and others that Natalia had been legally adopted by her mother's husband. I recalled that when I first met Natalia in 1994 or 1995, Natalia went by the surname Estis. I learned from Natalia that the name of Natalia's stepfather, her mother's husband, is Rickey Estis. I am also aware that Natalia never went by the last name Shurland.

15. When Cruz subsequently repeated the information about Natalia's adoption to my attorney Nishonda Tynes in my presence, Ms. Tynes advised that if that is the case, in the eyes of the law, Natalia is no longer the child of her biological parents but is the child of her adoptive parents. As such, Natalia did not retain rights as a child of our Dad Carlson Henry Shurland and therefore does not have an interest in the Estate.

16. As a result of this, it was determined that Cruz was at that time the only lawful heir of our deceased father; he was the next of kin and sole personal representative of the Estate and therefore the only person entitled to be served on behalf of the Estate.

19. Further, in response to the allegation that I and/or my attorney failed to give full and frank disclosure, Ms Tynes has advised that her notes from the hearing of my application herein record that the learned judge asked whether there were any children of Carlson Henry Shurland other than myself and Cruz. In response, attorney Harvey O. Tynes advised the court that his instructions were that there was another daughter but that daughter had been legally adopted by her mother's husband. Ms. Tynes' notes are consistent with my recollection of the exchange concerning the existence of another child except I do not recall who had answered the judge's question."

[26.] Carin further explained in her 13 November, 2025 affidavit that she had also discussed the possibility of obtaining Natalia's adoption records with her attorney who subsequently advised that upon inquiry from the Minnesota Department of Health that in order to find out information

pertaining to an adoption, a form would have to be completed and submitted by the adopted person. She observed that neither she nor her attorneys expected that Natalia would be cooperative in this regard but *“anticipated that once the mater came before the courts, I would have an opportunity to make my concerns known and seek the court’s assistance in compelling Natalia to provide either her adoption records, or proof of non-adoption as well as a copy of Natalia’s long form birth certificate indicating details of changes made to her birth record since the registration of her birth. I anticipated that having filed a caveat in relation to my father’s estate, the opportunity to seek clarification regarding Natalia’s status would arise if Natalia sought to make application for a Grant in relation to the Estate.”*

- [27.] This issue of Natalia’s adoption was contained in the affidavit of Pleasant Bridgewater in support of the declaration of paternity proceedings brought by Carin. She had this to say:

“3. I knew that Carlon’s eldest child, Natalia was born to an American woman with whom Carlson once shared a relationship. The relationship did not last. On several occasions Carlson mentioned to me that Natalia had been adopted by her mother’s husband and that Carlson had signed documents consenting to the adoption as he thought that at the time that it would be in Natalia’s best interest.”

- [28.] Carin’s position is that the birth certificate adduced by Natalia was not signed by the deceased. Nor, is there a birth certificate noting that the deceased was the “informant”. The birth certificate of Renaldo has the deceased listed as the “informant”.

- [29.] Further, she took issue with the notation on the birth certificate *“Amendments made prior to August 09, 2000 for this record are not noted on the certified copy.”* Carin has suggested that the notation does not necessarily exclude the possibility that an adoption occurred if the relevant amendment was made before that date.

- [30.] However, while Carin contends that Natalia was adopted by her stepfather, Rickey Estis, that contention has not been pleaded. The contested probate proceedings are not premised on the basis that Natalia was adopted, but rather on the assertion that Carin was excluded from the application for the grant of Letters of Administration. The Court therefore makes no final determination in these proceedings as to whether Natalia was adopted or the effect of any adoption upon her rights in the estate.

Preliminary Issue

- [31.] The first preliminary issue is whether Mikia S. Cooper has authority to bring the application on behalf of Natalia.

- [32.] Carin has objected to Ms. Cooper's application on the basis that she is neither a party to the action nor, has she applied for joinder. Further, that she has not exhibited the Power of Attorney by which she claims to act.
- [33.] That objection regarding the power of attorney is not a mere technicality. A person seeking substantive relief must establish the basis upon which that person is properly before the Court, and where acting for another, must demonstrate authority to do so.
- [34.] Where a person relies on a power of attorney as the source of authority to take steps in litigation, the scope of that authority depends on the terms of the instrument itself. In **James Julius Isaaks (by the Bank of Scotland Plc Acting as Attorney) v Charlton Triangle Homes Ltd [2015] EWHC 2611 (Ch)**, the High Court considered the wording of the power of attorney and held that the question was whether the power was sufficiently wide to authorise the institution and prosecution of the proceedings. It follows that the Court must be able to inspect the power of attorney, or a certified copy, before accepting that the asserted authority exists and extends to the steps proposed in these proceedings.
- [35.] The Court is not prepared to proceed on an unverified assertion that Mikia S. Cooper is authorised to act on behalf of Natalia by power of attorney. Therefore, Ms Cooper would need to provide proof of the power of attorney.

Addition of Natalia as a Party to the Declaration of Paternity Proceedings

- [36.] The Respondent has also complained that the declaration of paternity proceedings was conducted without notice to her and referred to the duty of full and frank disclosure as being well established in **Brink's-Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 1 WLR 1350**, as cited with approval by Winder J in **Attorney General v Pierino Zanga (2020/CLE/gen/00424)**, in which the Court held:

3 "The duty of the applicant is to make a full disclosure of all material facts... The applicant must make proper inquiries before making the application, and if material non-disclosure is established, the court will be astute to ensure that a plaintiff who obtains an order without full disclosure is deprived of any advantage gained by that breach of duty." 12.2 An applicant must act with the utmost good faith and disclose all material facts whether favourable or adverse that are known or reasonably ascertainable through proper inquiry (Zanga). Where a party fails to observe this strict duty, any advantage obtained through the without-notice order cannot be retained, and the order is liable to be set aside.

- [37.] The Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules, 19.2(3) (the "CPR") reads as follows:

"The Court may add a new party to proceedings without an application, if— (a) it is desirable to add the new party so that the Court can resolve all the matters in dispute in the proceedings; or (b) there is an issue involving the new party which is connected to the matters in dispute in the proceedings and it is desirable to add the new party so that the Court can resolve that issue."

[38.] Section 9 and 12 of the Status of Children Act, 2002 provides as follows:

9. (1) Any person who — (a) being a woman, alleges that any named person is the father of her child; (b) alleges that the relationship of father and child exists between himself and any other person; or (c) being a person having a proper interest in the result, wishes to have it determined whether the relationship of father and child exists between two named persons, may apply in such other manner as may be prescribed by rules of court to the court for a declaration of paternity, and if it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the relationship exists the court may make a declaration of paternity whether or not the father or the child or both of them are living or dead. (2) Where a declaration of paternity under subsection (1) is made after the death of the father or of the child, the court may at the same or any subsequent time make a declaration determining, for the purposes of paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of section 7, whether any of the requirements of that paragraph have been satisfied.

12. Where a declaration has been made under section 9 or 10 and evidence becomes available that was not available at the previous hearing, the court may, upon application for the variation or discharge of such declaration, vary or discharge that declaration or give such directions as are ancillary thereto."

[39.] Part 39.5 Application to set aside judgment given in a party's absence.

- (1) A party who was not present at a trial at which judgment was given or an order made may apply to set aside that judgment or order.*
- (2) The application must be made within fourteen days after the date on which the judgment or order was served on the applicant.*
- (3) The application to set aside the judgment or order must be supported by evidence on affidavit showing — (a) (b) a good reason for failing to attend the hearing; and that it is likely that had the applicant attended some other judgment or order might have been given or made.*

[40.] Part 11.20 of the CPR reads as follows:

- (1) A party who was not present when an order was made may apply to set aside or vary the order.*
- (2) ...*
- (3) The application to set aside the order must be supported by evidence on affidavit showing*
 - (a) a good reason for failing to attend the hearing; and*
 - (b) that it is likely that had the applicant attended some other order might have been made.*

[41.] Despite Natalia's application being brought under Rule 39.5 it is my view that it is, however, not applicable to the facts of this case. That rule permits a party who was absent from a trial at which judgment or an order was made to apply to set aside that judgment or order. Natalia was not a party to the proceedings in which the declaration of paternity was made and, accordingly, cannot in my view invoke that rule.

[42.] The second rule relied upon by Natalia was Part 11 of the CPR which may govern the procedure applicable to the present application, however, the Court's substantive jurisdiction to vary or discharge a declaration of paternity is derived from section 12 of the Status of Children Act.

- [43.] Section 12, rather than rule 39.5, is therefore the statutory basis upon which the Court must determine whether the existing declaration should be varied or discharged.
- [44.] Carin obtained a declaration of paternity on the 8th August, 2024 without notice to Natalia or adding her as a party. That is undisputed.
- [45.] It is also clear that Carin and Natalia were each familiar with each other from childhood.
- [46.] However, Carin explained that her reason for not serving Natalia with the declaration of paternity proceedings was because she thought that Natalia had been adopted by her stepfather. Though it was obvious that while Carin may have held the belief that Natalia had been adopted, she possessed no proof of this at the time of the filing of the declaration of paternity action. In any event if Carin honestly held the view that Natalia was adopted at the time of the making of the declaration of paternity application, it is still unclear why she did not serve the declaration of paternity in 2024 when she had obtained it or, to advise the attorney for Natalia when questioned about her status by email in 2025.
- [47.] Further, correspondence from Carin's attorney dated 23 December, 2024 is at odds with Carin's belief that Natalia was adopted. She wrote:

"We act on behalf of Ms Carin Bullard, daughter of the late Carlson Henry Shurland who died in Grand Bahama on July 15, 2024. We understand that you represent Mrs. Natalia Trent.

Our instructions are that shortly after the passing of Mr. Shurland...

As you are aware, Mrs. Trent's rights as it relates to the Estate of Carlson Henry Shurland are no greater than those of Ms Bullard or Mr. Renaldo Shurland. As such, Mrs. Trent was not entitled to act unilaterally as she did in removing Mr. Shurland's records out of the jurisdiction without the prior knowledge and consent of both Ms. Bullard and Mr. Renaldo Shurland. Moreover, Mrs. Trent has no entitlement to possess the said documents to the exclusion of Ms. Bullard and Mr. Renaldo Shurland.

We are presently....

[my emphasis added]

- [48.] It is well established that an applicant who seeks relief without notice bears a strict duty of full and frank disclosure of all material facts, whether favourable or adverse, as articulated in **Brink's-Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1988] 1 WLR 1350** and affirmed locally in **Attorney General v Pierino Zanga 2020/CLE/gen/00424**. The rationale is that the court, deprived of the safeguard of the appearance of both parties, must be able to rely on the applicant's utmost good faith. Where material non-disclosure is established, the court will be astute to ensure that any advantage obtained is not retained. In the present case, Carin obtained a declaration of paternity without notice to Natalia, despite having no documentary proof of her asserted belief that Natalia was adopted. That belief,

unsupported by evidence, could not justify withholding service. In those circumstances, Natalia ought properly to have been served with the application or at the very least notified of the declaration of paternity. The failure to do so constituted a serious issue of procedural fairness and may amount to a failure of full and frank disclosure.

- [49.] The fact that the declaration of paternity was obtained without notice to Natalia does not, of itself, require that it be set aside or discharged. The absence of notice nevertheless supports the addition of Natalia as a party so that she may participate in the proceedings and place before the Court any evidence upon which she relies.
- [50.] The power to vary or discharge the declaration arises under section 12 of the Status of Children Act only where evidence becomes available that was not available at the previous hearing. The question for the Court, once Natalia has been properly joined and the relevant evidence has been filed, is whether the evidence relied upon meets that statutory threshold and is sufficiently material to warrant variation or discharge of the declaration.
- [51.] The Court is supported in this conclusion to add Natalia as a party by the provisions of Rule 19.2(3) of the CPR, which expressly empowers the Court to add a new party where it is desirable to resolve all matters in dispute or where an issue involving that party is connected to the proceedings. In **Howden Joinery Ltd v Brain [2015] EWHC 3999** the High Court confirmed that rule 19.2 which is similar to our rule 19.2 gives the court power itself to order the addition of a party.
- [52.] The proper course, therefore, is to join Natalia as a party so that the application under section 12 may be determined with her participation. No conclusion is presently reached, however, as to whether the declaration should be varied or discharged.
- [53.] In my view, had notice or joinder occurred at an earlier stage, the subsequent application for Letters of Administration might well have included Carin and thereby obviated the need for her to seek to have the grant set aside. Certainly, at the very least, Natalia would have had an opportunity to participate in the proceedings before the declaration of paternity was granted in favour of Carin. Such participation might have avoided the competing applications now before the Court.
- [54.] Finally, the Court has observed that both Carin and Natalia have, in separate proceedings, each described the other as a child of the deceased—Carin in her contested probate action and Natalia in the probate application in the United States of America. It has not gone unnoticed that these positions stand in stark contradiction to the adversarial stance now adopted. The parties would therefore do well to reflect upon whether the present applications are truly necessary and to consider whether alternatives to litigation may better serve the interests of resolution, dignity, and familial peace.
- [55.] In the circumstances, I make the following orders:

- (i) Ms. Mikia S. Cooper shall, within 21 days of this Order, file and serve the recorded Power of Attorney (exhibited to an affidavit) upon which she claims to act for the Respondent, Mrs. Natalia Trent in these proceedings.
- (ii) Upon compliance with Order (i), the question whether the Power of Attorney authorizes Ms. Mikia S. Cooper to act for Mrs. Natalia Trent in these proceedings shall be determined by the Court. If the Court is satisfied that it does, Mrs. Natalia Trent, acting by her attorney Ms. Mikia S. Cooper, shall be added as a Respondent to these proceedings pursuant to rule 19.2(3) of the Supreme Court Civil Procedure Rules, 2022.
- (iii) Within 28 days after Mrs. Natalia Trent is added as a Respondent, she may, acting by Ms. Mikia S. Cooper if authorized under the Power of Attorney, file and serve any additional affidavit evidence upon which she intends to rely.
- (iv) Mrs. Natalia Trent shall, within the period prescribed by Order (iii), file and serve an affidavit addressing all matters material to this application that are within her personal knowledge.
- (v) Within 21 days after service of Mrs. Trent's affidavit evidence, Ms. Bullard may file and serve a responding affidavit, limited to matters arising from that evidence.
- (vi) The Court will adjourn the hearing of the Respondent's application for the variation or discharge of the declaration of paternity under section 12 of the Status of Children Act pending compliance with Orders (i) to (iv).
- (vii) The Court will thereafter set a status hearing to set directions for the progress of this matter at a date mutually convenient to the parties and the Court.
- (viii) Costs are reserved.

Dated the 27th day of July, 2026



Camille Darville Gomez
Justice