

COMMONWEALTH OF THE BAHAMAS

2022

IN THE SUPREME COURT

CRI/VBI/102/4

Criminal Division

Between

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

VS

GLENRESHA WILLIAMS & MICHELLE WILLIAMS

BEFORE The Honourable Madam Justice Renae McKay

APPEARANCES: Ms. T'Shura Ambrose along with Mr. Ashton Williams for the Prosecution
 Ms. Tamika Roberts for the Convicts

HEARD ON: 27th March A.D. 2026, 19th May A.D. 2026, 3rd June A.D. 2026

DECISION ON SENTENCING

MCKAY, J:

INTRODUCTION

1. Glenresha Williams and Michelle Williams (hereinafter referred to as “the Convicts”) were charged with being concerned together and with another in committing the offences of offences of Attempted Murder (2 counts), contrary to section 292 of the Penal Code, Chapter 84 and Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life (2 counts), contrary to section 33 of the Firearms Act, Chapter 213.
2. The trial of the matter commenced in the Supreme Court on 3rd November, 2025 and concluded on 21st November, 2025, when a jury returned a majority verdict of 8-1 guilty on all counts.
3. A probation report was requested on behalf of the Convicts and the matter was thereafter adjourned awaiting receipt of the same.

4. Bail was continued pending sentencing. However, the prosecution having objected, the Convicts remained in custody at the Bahamas Department of Correctional Services pending the determination of that matter.
5. By a decision dated 18th December, 2025, both Convicts were ordered by the Court of Appeal to be remanded at the Bahamas Department of Correctional Services pending sentencing.
6. A probation report dated 26th February, 2026 was prepared Ms. Deah Duvalier on behalf of Glenresha Williams and received by this Court. A probation report dated 26th February, 2026 was prepared by Ms. Tabitha Hanna on behalf of Michelle Williams and was similarly received by this Court.
7. Both documents, the impact statement of the Virtual Complainant, Mr. Cooper, the oral and written submissions by the Crown and the Defence, provided useful aids in the exercise of the Court's discretion in arriving at an appropriate sentence, having regard to all of the circumstances of this case.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

8. The evidence of the Virtual Complainants, Adrian Cooper and Savannah Bain (hereinafter referred to as "the VC's") was that sometime on Thursday 28th October, 2021, while at their residence located in the Fox Hill area, they were encountered by the Convicts, Michelle Williams (being the owner and landlord of the said residence) and Glenresha Williams being the daughter of Michelle Williams.
9. The VC's stated that while leaving their apartment in their vehicle, they were blocked by a black Murano SUV, at which time, Glenresha Williams exited the passenger side of the SUV, approached the Virtual Complainant, Savannah Bain and assaulted her.
10. Mr. Adrian Cooper then intervened and it was at this time that a male exited the black SUV and produced a firearm. The altercation stopped and the Convict's along with the male returned to the black SUV and drove off. The VC's also left and subsequently followed behind the Convicts in efforts to obtain the license plate number for the VC's to report this incident to the police.
11. The vehicles came to a stop at a dead end of an unnamed road in Fox Hill. The VC's then observed the unknown male exit the black SUV, produce a firearm and discharged it in the direction of the VC's before continuing to leave, putting them in fear for their lives.
12. Consequently the Complainants became in fear for their lives and Mr. Cooper then reversed his vehicle and sped away.
13. Having reported this matter to the police, the VC's identified the Convicts as the persons

along with the unknown gunman at the time of the commission of these offences. Both Convicts were arrested, questioned and charged relative to this matter.

ISSUE

14. Based on the jury's verdict of guilt on the offences charged relative to the Convicts, what is an appropriate sentence having regard to all of the circumstances of the offence and the offenders?

LAW

15. The Convicts were charged with two (2) counts of Attempted Murder, contrary to Section 292 of the Penal Code, Chapter 84 which provides as follows:

“Whoever attempts to commit murder shall be liable to a certain penalty.”

16. The Convicts were also charged with two (2) counts of Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life, contrary to section 33 of the Firearms Act, Chapter 213 which provides as follows:

“If any person has in his possession any firearm or ammunition with intent by means thereof to endanger life or cause serious injury to property, or to enable any other person by means thereof to endanger life or cause serious injury to property, he shall, whether any injury to person or property has been caused or not, be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable —

(a) on conviction on information to a term of imprisonment in the range of ten years to fifteen years”

17. Additionally, section 185 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter 91 provides as follows:

“The court may, before passing sentence, receive such evidence as it thinks fit in order to inform itself as to the sentence proper to be passed and may hear counsel on any mitigating or other circumstances which may be relevant.”

and therefore, the Probation reports for both convicts the contents of the probation reports were useful in assisting this Court in arriving at an appropriate sentence.

PROBATION REPORTS

18. The report of Probation Officer Ms. Deah Duvalier dated the 26th February, 2026 in respect of Glenresha Williams indicated that it was compiled having received information from a number of persons including the Convict, her mother (co-accused), Mrs. Michelle Williams; her father, Mr. Glenroy Williams; her friend, Ms. Arnese Roxbury; her maternal

aunt, Ms. Tamar Delancy; her cousin, Ms. Phillipa Burrows; her neighbor, Mr. Charles Nottage; her former employer, Mrs. Joan Darling, Proprietor of Darling Shire Small Business; victim, Mr. Adrian Cooper; victim, Ms. Savannah Bain; and a tenant of her co-accused, who wished to remain anonymous.

19. Additional information was obtained from the Convict's file at the Records Office at the Bahamas Department of Correctional Services (BDOCS) and the Criminal Records Office (CRO) of the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF).
20. Glenresha Williams was described as honest, family-oriented and an ambitious individual who is devoted to her children. She was also said to be pleasant, enthusiastic, hardworking, reliable, nice, humble and a helpful individual, who had a "beautiful personality and was very well liked". However, they were generally shocked to learn of her involvement in the present offences and wished for her to be released.
21. The VC, Mr. Adrian Cooper expressed in the report as well as in his viva voce evidence given on 27th March, 2026, inter alia, that he has forgiven the convict, however, recanted this forgiveness and indicated that if the convict is released, he will be in fear for his life and therefore desires that the convict be penalized for her involvement in the present offences.
22. Mr. Adrian Cooper initially forgave the convict; however, he indicated that he recanted his forgiveness and prior statements and wished that the Convict be penalized for her actions. Ms. Savannah Bain further stated that the Convict should be penalized for her involvement in the present offences.
23. It was further reported that the Convict continues to maintain her innocence, hence, she has not expressed remorse for her involvement in the offences.
24. Prior to the present offences, the Convict was a law-abiding citizen, having no previous convictions nor pending matters.
25. The report of Probation Officer Ms. Tabitha Hanna dated the 26th February, 2026 in respect of Michelle Williams indicated that was compiled having received information from a number of persons including the Convict, her mother, Ms. Shirley Armbrister; her brothers, Mr. Huey Armbrister Jr. and Mr. Philip Armbrister; her estranged husband, Mr. Glenroy Williams and her friends, Mrs. Portia Sands and Ms. Leah Patton.
26. Additional information was obtained from the Convict's file at the Records Office at the Bahamas Department of Correctional Services (BDOCS) and the Criminal Records Office (CRO) of the Royal Bahamas Police Force (RBPF).
27. The report of Mrs. Michelle Williams was favorable and emphasized her generosity. Interviewee's noted that people would take advantage of her. It was also shared that she maintained a good relationship with relatives. However, they voiced their dismay regarding

the charge and expressed that their loved ones were wrongfully convicted.

28. Again, Mr. Adrian Cooper, indicated his initial forgiveness, later recanting the same and expressing apprehension regarding his safety, in the event the Convict was released, to retaliate against him.
29. Ms. Savannah Bain expressed her desire that the Convict be penalized for her actions and stated that her fate is in the hands of the Lord and the Court.
30. It was further reported that the Convict maintains her innocence hence and has not expressed remorse for her involvement in the offences.
31. Prior to the present offences, the Convict was a law-abiding citizen, having no previous convictions nor pending matters.

SUBMISSIONS

32. Counsel for the Crown submitted that in arriving at an appropriate sentence, consideration must be given to the general principles of sentencing. They referenced the case of **Prince Hepburn v Regina SCCr App No. 79 of 2013**, where Mr. Justice Adderley described the sentencing function and the factors to be considered in arriving at an appropriate sentence at paragraph 36 of the judgment:

“In exercising his sentencing function judicially, the sentencing judge must individualize the crime to the particular perpetrator and the particular victim so that he can, in accordance with his legal mandate, identify and take into consideration the aggravating as well as the mitigating factors applicable to the particular perpetrator in the particular case. This includes but is not limited to considering the nature of the crime and the manner and circumstances in which it was carried out, the age of the convict, whether or not he pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, whether he had past convictions of a similar nature and his conduct before and after the crime was committed. He must ensure that having regard to the objects of sentencing: retribution, deterrence, prevention and rehabilitation that the tariff is reasonable and the sentence is fair and proportionate to the crime.”

33. It was further submitted that Wooding CJ in the Trinidadian Court of Appeal case of **Benjamin v R (1964) 7 WIR 459**, accepted as a correct statement in the Modern Law Review of September 1964 that there are really five objects which comprise the aims of punishment:

- a) **RETRIBUTION:** This is in recognition that the punishment is intended to reflect the denouncement by society and legislature of the offence and the offender.

- b) **DETERRENCE: *vis a vis*** potential offenders. The offender must be punished appropriately to deter other like-minded offenders from engaging in that form of behavior.
- c) **DETERRENCE: *vis a vis*** the particular offender. Here, the purpose is to seek to ensure that the offender himself is deterred from future criminal conduct by the punishment inflicted on him.
- d) **PREVENTION:** This is aimed at preventing the particular offender from offending against the law by incarcerating him.
- e) **REHABILITATION:** The aim is to rehabilitate the offender so that he may reform his ways to become a contributing member of society.

34. Counsel contends that each case must depend upon its own circumstances and various factors must be considered by the Court in deciding which principle of sentencing should predominate.

35. The Crown noted **section 292** (supra) and further commended to the Court **section 83 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 84** which states the following:

“Whoever attempts to commit an offence shall, if the attempt is frustrated by reason only of accident or of circumstances or events independent of his will, be deemed guilty of an attempt in the first degree, and shall, except as in this Code otherwise expressly provided, be punishable in the same manner as if the offence had been completed.”

and **section 291 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, Chapter 84** which provides the following:

“(1) Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary-
(a)
(b) Every person convicted of Murder to whom paragraph (a) does not apply-
(i) shall be sentenced to such other term given the circumstances of the offence of the offender as the court considers appropriate being within the range of thirty-sixty years’ imprisonment.”

36. Counsel relied on the Court of Appeal decision in **James Miller v. Regina SCCrApp No. 106 of 2009**, where the Appellant was convicted of Attempted Murder, Armed Robbery, Causing Grievous Harm and Possession of a Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life. He was initially sentenced to life imprisonment for Attempted Murder. However, this was substituted by the Court of Appeal to 40 years’ imprisonment. His sentences of 25 years for Armed Robbery and 14 years for Possession of a Firearm to Endanger Life were affirmed by the Court of Appeal.

37. The facts in **Miller** indicate that the Appellant along with others robbed Scotia Bank’s East Street and Soldier Road Branch while armed with a handgun. They robbed customers and robbed customers and employees of cash. On exiting the bank after the Armed Robbery,

they encountered a police officer driving a police car and opened fire on her, hitting her in the head. They were eventually chased by the police and fired shots at the police who were chasing them before getting arrested. The Court of Appeal stated at **paragraph 35**:

“It is trite that the sentence for an attempt is the same as that for the substantive offence.”

38. It was submitted that based on the aforementioned provisions, Parliament’s intention was to inflict a stiff penalty on persons committing this offence and that it should be noted that although the Courts now have substantial discretion when passing sentences for Attempted Murder, that discretion must be exercised judicially with consideration to all of the relevant factors of the case.
39. Counsel for the Crown submitted that in relation to Glenresha Williams, there were six (6) aggravating factors:
- The offence was of a serious nature
 - The jury found that there was an intention to kill
 - There was a dangerous weapon used, namely a firearm
 - The impact that the offence has on the victims
 - Maintains innocence and has not expressed remorse
 - The victims were put through trauma of testifying, having to give evidence and reliving the offence
- and one (1) mitigating factor:
- No previous convictions
40. Similarly, as it relates to Michelle Williams counsel for the Crown submitted that there were six (6) aggravating factors:
- The offence was of a serious nature
 - The jury found that there was an intention to kill
 - There was a dangerous weapon used, namely a firearm
 - The impact that the offence has on the victims
 - Maintains innocence and has not expressed remorse
 - The victims were put through trauma of testifying, having to give evidence and reliving the offence
- and one (1) mitigating factor:
- No previous convictions
41. Therefore, counsel for the Crown submits that after taking into consideration the principles of sentencing, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the circumstances of this case and the circumstances of the offenders, the appropriate sentence for both offences and offenders is a term of twenty-five (25) years imprisonment. The authorities of **Michael Scott v Regina SCCrApp No. 163 of 2012**, **Shawn Culmer v Regina SCCrApp No. 69 of 2007**, **Neil Ingraham v Regina SCCrApp No. 173 of 2019**, **Raul Pierre v Regina SCCrApp**

No. 48 of 2017 and The Attorney General v Vilner Desir and Delano Taylor SCCrApp No. 45 of 2015 were relied on and commended to the Court.

42. In relation to Glenresha and Michelle Williams, counsel for the Convicts also relied on paragraph 36 of **Hepburn** (supra) and emphasize the object of sentencing, sentencing principles, that the sentence must be fair and proportionate and that each case should be considered on its own facts.

43. Counsel for the Convict submitted that in relation to Glenresha Williams, there were four (4) aggravating factors:

- The use of a firearm (albeit by another)
- The offence was committed in a public roadway/residential area
- There were two (2) complainants affected
- Shots were discharged

and eleven (12) mitigating factors:

- Gainfully employed prior to the commission of this offence
- She did not discharge the firearm
- The alleged shooter was not before the Courts
- No evidence that the convicts supplied or handed over a firearm.
- No evidence of express nor implied instruction to shoot.
- No evidence of prior knowledge of the firearm prior to the gunman producing it
- No doctor testified to any injuries suffered
- No medical report.
- No evidence of life-threatening injury
- No evidence of permanent harm
- No previous convictions
- No history of violence

44. Counsel further submitted that Glenresha Williams is a mother of three school-aged sons (Kyle, Kaden and Karter), and is their primary caregiver.

45. Counsel for the Convict submitted that in relation to Michelle Williams, there were four (4) aggravating factors:

- The use of a firearm (albeit by another)
- The offence was committed in a public roadway/residential area
- There were two (2) complainants affected
- Shots were discharged

and eleven (11) mitigating factors:

- Gainfully employed prior to the commission of this offence
- She did not discharge the firearm

- The alleged shooter was not before the Courts
- No evidence that the convicts supplied or handed over a firearm.
- No evidence of express nor implied instruction to shoot.
- No evidence of prior knowledge of the firearm prior to the gunman producing it
- No doctor testified to any injuries suffered
- No medical report.
- No evidence of life-threatening injury
- No evidence of permanent harm
- No previous convictions
- No history of violence

46. Counsel further noted that Michelle Williams the mother of the Hailey Williams who is presently a student at the University of The Bahamas and that Michelle Williams is solely financially responsible for her daughter Hailey.

47. In furthering her submissions relative to Michelle Williams' employment history, counsel advanced that Michelle Williams has been employed in the public service in excess of twenty (20) years with an unblemished record at the Registrar General's Office.

48. Counsel contends that this matter arose out of a domestic dispute between a landlord and tenant and was not a premeditated armed attack or one arising out of a conspiracy to execute.

49. Therefore, counsel for the Convict urged upon the Court the principle of proportionality, individualizing justice and submits that while the aggravating features are acknowledged, the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and when the case is looked at in the round, the circumstances dictate that an appropriate sentence would be in the range of four (4) to seven (7) years. The authorities of **Shawn Culmer v Regina SCCrApp No. 69 of 2007**, **Raul Pierre v Regina SCCrApp No. 48 of 2017** and **James Miller v SCCrApp No. 106 of 2009** were distinguished. The case of **The Director of Public Prosecutions v Ernesta Butler SCCrApp No. 97 of 2019** was relied on.

DISCUSSION

50. This Court notes the relevant statutory provisions for both offences.

51. In relation to the offence of Attempted Murder, while the Crown has sought to marry **section 83 (2) of the Penal Code, Chapter 84** and **Section 291 (1) (b) of the Penal Code, Chapter 84** to support a 30-60 year range, I am guided by their Lordships in **The Director of Public Prosecutions v Ernesta Butler SCCrApp No. 97 of 2019**, where the Court of Appeal described these submissions as "fundamentally flawed".

52. Paragraphs 9 – 15 of **Butler** are as follows:

“9. In my judgment this submission fundamentally flawed.

10. Section 291 (1)(b) has no application to a charge of attempted murder.

11. Section 83 of the Penal Code is irrelevant. That section only applies to the punishment for inchoate offences “except as in this Code otherwise expressly provided”.

12. The Penal Code expressly provides for the punishment of the offence of attempted murder. Section 292 of the Penal Code provides: “292. Whoever attempts to commit murder shall be liable to imprisonment for life.”

13. Whilst the maximum penalty for murder has been death, the maximum penalty for attempted murder has never been death.

14. The power of a sentencing judge to punish a person convicted of attempted murder is very wide. Section 291 (as amended) has never been construed as restraining a sentencing judge from going outside the range of 30 to 60 years for attempted murder; nor has it been construed as only permitting a sentencing judge from going outside that range save in exceptional circumstances.

15. There are many cases in which this Court has approved or imposed sentences of less than 30 years for attempted murder.”

53. Further, at paragraph 24, the Court stated:

“In the circumstances, I would reject the submission that as a principle of law on a charge of attempted murder, the sentence must be within the range of 30 to 60 unless there can be demonstrated exceptional circumstances to depart from that range. The 30 to 60 years range was intended in my view to be applicable to the offence of murder in place of the previous fixed sentence of death. I reject the submission that in imposing a sentence of 7 years the sentencing judge erred in any principle of law.”

54. Here, their Lordships expressly state that no such range exists as a matter of principle on a charge of attempted murder and exceptional circumstances are not required to depart from that range.

55. Nevertheless, ordinary sentencing principles and guidelines as expressed in **Hepburn**, including retribution, deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and proportionality are key aspects of ensuring that the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing is not carried out capriciously.

56. The principle of proportionality and its effects on the sentencing Judge was discussed in **Jermaine Ramdeen v The Commissioner of Police MCCrApp No. 64 of 2018**, where at paragraph 5, it stated:

“8. Proportionality in sentencing is concerned with the relationship between the seriousness of the offence committed and the sentence imposed. At the same time proportionality is about the sentencing process, not only its result. Properly understood, proportionality in sentencing entitles an offender ‘to a process directed at crafting a just sentence’ and ‘a sentencing judge is prohibited from arriving at sentences contingent on factors unrelated to the determination of a fit sentence’.

9. The principle of proportionality was discussed by MacMenamin J. in the Irish High Court in the case of Gilligan v Ireland and others [2013] IESC

45. The learned judge opined that modern authorities make clear the fact that the judiciary is entrusted with the task of applying the principle of proportionality in sentencing and that the origin of this principle can be found in the very nature of the judicial task. He then had these instructive observations:

“34. One of the hallmarks of the exercise of judicial discretion in sentencing is the application of the overriding principle of proportionality...

35. By now, it is well established that the distributive principle of punishment under our law requires that, in general, every sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence, and take into account the personal circumstances of the offender (see Deaton; Osmanovic; and Lynch and Whelan v Minister for Justice). Here, the term "proportionality" is used in the sense of the judicial task of striking a balance between 4 the particular circumstances of the commission of the offence, and the circumstances of the offender to be sentenced.

36. In sentencing, proportionality only arises when the judge is exercising a judicial discretion as to sentence, within parameters laid down by law. Obviously, the principle does not arise in the case of mandatory penalties. The test of

proportionality does however apply in every case where the offence, on conviction, carries a maximum, as opposed to a mandatory sentence. Thus, it arises in any situation where a trial court has a discretion as to the particular penalty to be imposed, within the statutory maximum sentence.”

57. Additionally, as it relates to the charge of Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life, this court also notes the 10-15 year range provided by section 33(a). However, section 2 of the **Abolition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences Act, Chapter 94A** provides that:

“2. Where a provision in any law has the effect of requiring a court to impose a minimum term of imprisonment that provision, to the extent of that requirement, shall be of no effect.”

58. In support of the Crown’s recommendation on sentence, they commended the case of **Culmer v Regina SCCrApp NO. 69 of 2007**, in which a 25 year sentence was upheld. It is important to note that the circumstances of this case included a home invasion, in which the VC was shot twice. There was a third attempt by the Appellant to shoot the deceased in the head, however the firearm malfunctioned.

59. The Crown also commended **Neil Ingraham v Regina SCCrApp No. 173 of 2019**, where a 34 year sentence was upheld. In this case, the VC was shot 6 times about his body.

60. In the case of **The Attorney General v. Vilner Desir, Delano Taylor v Regina SCCrApp. No. 45 of 2015**, where a 25 year sentence was imposed by the Court of Appeal, the VC was chased and shot in the neck.

61. In **Rael Pierre v Regina SCCrApp. v Regina No. 48 of 2017**, the VC’s were chased and shot at, though not injured. The Court of Appeal found that a term of 15 years imprisonment for Attempted Murder and 10 years (less 2 years remand time) for Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life, were appropriate sentences.

62. While there is no exact formulae in sentencing, an evaluation of the authorities above show a relationship between the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence and the sentence imposed; ie the **Pierre** sentence where the VC was uninjured compared to the **Ingraham** sentence.

63. More recently, in the case of **The Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Mike Philius SCCrApp. No. 204 of 2024**, the Court of Appeal increased a 10 year sentence to 25 years, where the VC was shot outside her residence. The Convict produced a firearm and shot her in the pelvic area, struck her with the weapon, attempted to fire a second shot which

jammed, and threatened to kill her. She sustained serious injuries, was hospitalised for nineteen (19) days, and now requires a urostomy bag.

64. It is undeniable that the flagrant disregard and permanent injury indicated in **Philus**, justifying a 25 year sentence do not feature in this case.
65. In the instant case, no injuries were sustained by any of the complainants and while the convicts have been convicted pursuant to a joint enterprise, in individualizing the offence, the weapon cannot be said to have been placed in the hands of any of the convicts. There was also no evidence that the shooting was carried out by their instruction.
66. The Court accepts the jury's verdict necessarily reflects a finding of guilt based upon the doctrine of joint enterprise and, accordingly, a shared criminal responsibility for the offences committed. However, in determining an appropriate sentence, the court is entitled to individualize the offending conduct and assess the relative level of participation of each offender as enunciated in **Hepburn** (supra). In that regard, while the Convicts were found criminally liable for the acts committed in furtherance of the joint enterprise, neither Convict personally discharged the firearm nor was their evidence before the court that either Convict supplied the firearm. These matters relevant to the assessment of culpability on sentencing are not inconsistent with the verdict of the jury.
67. Conversely, Counsel for the Convict commended the case of **The Director of Public Prosecutions vs. Ernesta Butler SCCrApp No. 97 of 2019**. At paragraph 49, Crane-Scott, JA added:
- “49. In my view, paragraphs 9 – 24 of Barnett, P’s judgment convincingly answers the appellant’s submission that the sentence passed is wrong in principle. As I see it the offence of attempted murder is in a category of its own where the judge has an unbridled discretion unaffected by the judicial guidelines laid down in the case of The Attorney General v Larry Raymond Jones et al SCCrApp. Nos. 12, 18 and 19 of 2007 or statutory guidelines as established by section 291(1)(b) of the Penal Code. Put quite simply, there are no judicial or statutory sentencing guidelines applicable to the offence of attempted murder. Therefore, while the maximum sentence for attempted murder is life imprisonment it was completely within the judge’s sentencing discretion to impose a determinate sentence and to determine its length. What was required was that the learned judge demonstrate that she had weighed the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and exercised her discretion reasonably and according to law. On the record it is clear that this was done and therefore we are unable to interfere.”**
68. In determining an appropriate sentence, I accept the submissions of counsel for the Convict that the landlord and tenant relationship/dispute was more akin to a domestic dispute. Nevertheless, even if this is not the most accurate characterization, having regard to all of

the circumstances of the offence, I am satisfied that a 25 year sentence for Attempted Murder in the instant case, would be disproportionate and would not promote a sense of consistency in sentencing.

69. However, I do not accept that the sentence should be less than that imposed in **Butler**, notwithstanding the fact that the VC in **Butler** received a stab wound to the neck, with the medical evidence showing that but for medical intervention, the VC would have suffocated and died. In the instant case, a firearm was used (albeit not at the hands of the Convicts) and therefore this type of weapon aggravates the offence.
70. In relation to both convicts, I find that the factors aggravating this offence are the seriousness of the offence, a firearm was used and the lasting effect on the VC's. I also find that factors mitigating the offence are that the Convicts had no previous convictions, they were previously gainfully employed, the weapon was not used by the Convicts' hands, no injuries were caused and the Convicts can be rehabilitated.
71. A review of the authorities indicate that the judicial discretion is wide but must not be exercised unreasonably. Based on the principle of parity and the other sentencing principles, a term of imprisonment of 25 years would not be consistent with all the circumstances of this case.
72. The Court is of the view that the Convicts and other members of society should be deterred from these types of offences. I also find that the Convicts can be rehabilitated and return to continuing to be contributing members of society.

DECISION

73. I have reviewed and considered the authorities together with the relevant statutory provisions, the aggravating and mitigating factors, the factual matrix, the circumstances of the offence and the circumstances of the offenders.
74. This court is mindful of sentences passed and affirmed in similar cases. Having considered all of the circumstances of this particular case, this Court finds that the justice of this case requires a custodial sentence.
75. Accordingly, as it relates to Glenresha Williams, I shall impose a term of imprisonment of seven (7) years for the offence of Attempted Murder and Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life. These sentences are to run concurrently and take effect from the date of conviction less time spent on remand.
76. As it relates to Michelle Williams, I shall impose a term of imprisonment of seven (7) years for the offence of Attempted Murder and Possession of Firearm with Intent to Endanger Life. These sentences are to run concurrently and take effect from the date of conviction less time spent on remand.

77. Both convicts may appeal the sentences of this Court to the Court of Appeal within the statutory time.

Dated this 3rd day of June, A.D., 2026

The Honourable Madam Justice W. Renae McKay